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SENT TO: Amconsul GENEVA TOCAH

129 PRIORITY

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE ACTING SECRETARY

Following confirms your telecons with Murphy and me today and supplements TOCAH 127. We appreciate force of your argument that discussion has reached such an impasse that indefinite prolongation risks result of chipping away of our position. However, it seems to us that there are real vulnerabilities in Khrushchev's artful letter of June 17 which it might be useful to probe further with Gromyko in the next few days thus avoiding necessity of a substantive reply from here. I am listing below series of questions which we think might be put to him, in private meeting such as suggested TOCAH 124, and you will think of many others. Gromyko's postponement of session today also leads us to think he might be expecting new instructions conceivably going beyond blandly unyielding position of Khrushchev's letter.

We would not expect this exercise to go on for any length of time though we could envisage it might extend into next

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Dated by:

EUR:FDKohl;r:sj:inc

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

Acting Secretary *OP*

Classified:

6/18/59

S/S Mr. Calhoun

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week. If Couve has to be absent wouldn't it be possible for him to leave a Deputy behind if this proved necessary? ~~##~~ Following are suggested questions:

1. How can Khrushchev's statement that a summit meeting becomes more necessary if the Foreign Ministers do not reach meaningful understanding square with the understanding concerning the terms of reference of the Foreign Ministers conference reached in the exchange of letters dated March 26 and March 30?

2. What does Khrushchev mean when he stated that the "main obstacle to attainment of agreement" is merely a question of the time period? Has he not been informed that the question of recognition of Western rights to be in Berlin pending German reunification is the central point of contention?

3. Khrushchev states that it is "possible to agree on another period" than one year. Does this mean that the Soviets are prepared to recognize Western rights in Berlin for the period prior to German reunification? Why should any period be fixed in terms of time when clearly should be in terms of goal on which we all agree?

4. What is the quite certain positive significance unique in the work of the Foreign Ministers which Khrushchev sees?

5. The letter equates the time period in the Western peace plan with the Soviet ultimatum for the surrender of Western rights in

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Berlin in the course of one year; Has the Soviet Prime Minister not been informed that, unlike the Soviet proposal, the Western plan would involve no unilateral action against Soviet rights as in case Soviet proposals?

6. The letter states that the Soviet proposal would entail no QTE harm to anyone's interests. UNQTE. Is it the Soviet position that the surrender of ~~Western~~ ^{Western} rights in Berlin would not damage ~~Western~~ ^{Western} interests? Or the security and well-being of the West Berliners?

7. If, as the letter states, the question of the duration of Western rights in Berlin is QTE neither the main one nor one of principle UNQTE can the Soviet Union not agree to the maintenance of those rights until German reunification?

8. What does Khrushchev mean by stating that the Soviet proposal would QTE concentrate attention on what can reasonably be decided now UNQTE?

9. Khrushchev states that the Soviet Government has instructed the Foreign Minister to bend his QTE efforts in direction of drawing together points of view UNQTE. Does this signify Soviet willingness to negotiate on Western proposals on Berlin or on Western QTE peace plan UNQTE?

10. Does not the four powers QTE responsibility before the peoples UNQTE to use all means for easing tensions obligate the USSR

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to negotiate seriously at the Foreign Ministers' meeting as well as at a summit meeting?

11. Does Khrushchev's statement that the solution of important international problems are QTE beyond the powers of the Ministers UNQTE not contradict Soviet note of March 30 which said the Four Powers have QTE reached agreement to start solving urgent international questions UNQTE at a Foreign Ministers conference and a summit meeting UNQTE?

12. What QTE measures for obtaining the success of the conference UNQTE does the Soviet Foreign Minister consider he has taken when the latest Soviet proposals only reiterates Soviet positions advanced and rejected as a basis for negotiation prior to the conferences?

13. As the letter refers to better clarification of a number of questions, could the Soviet Foreign Minister clarify what worries the USSR in the existing situation in Berlin?

14. Does Soviet Government advance seriously proposals the QTE essence UNQTE of which consists in QTE gradually liquidating abnormal situation UNQTE, i.e., Western position in Berlin?

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